 Strong output and productivity growth in manufacturing are oft en cited as evidence that U.S. manufacturing is doing well and that automation is primarily responsible for the employment declines. A careful look at the evidence does not support this popular view.
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Th e manufacturing sector experienced a precipitous and historically unprecedented decline in employment in the 2000s, which coincided with a surge in imports, weak growth in exports, and a yawning trade defi cit. Th e sharp job losses in manufacturing signifi cantly contributed to the weak employment growth and low labor force participation characterizing the U.S. economy for much of this period.
Th e plight of U.S. manufacturing featured prominently in the 2016 presidential election, with candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders arguing that globalization had severely damaged U.S. factories and workers. Th at message resonated in many American communities and helped propel Trump to the presidency. Making good on campaign promises, the president pulled out of the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership agreement, has proposed renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement, and most recently has threatened high tariff s on Chinese imports, raising concerns about a trade war.
An alternative view, which many economists embrace, holds that automation, not globalization, largely explains manufacturing's relative employment declines and, in recent years, steep job losses. As evidence, proponents of this view point to statistics showing robust output growth and much higher productivity growth in manufacturing relative to the aggregate economy. Th is perspective oft en is presented as the consensus view among economists and taken as fact in media reports.
Th e view, however, refl ects a misreading of the data. Although automation is occurring in manufacturing, as in other sectors of the economy, neither the descriptive nor the research evidence supports the view that automation was the leading cause of the relative and absolute decline in manufacturing employment in the 2000s.
Th e Collapse of Manufacturing Employment in the 2000s
Manufacturing employment trended upward in the years following World War II, peaking at over 19 million in 1979 19 million in . From 1979 19 million in to 1989 , the year of the next business cycle peak, manufacturing shed 1.4 million jobs, or 7.4 percent of its base, with job losses concentrated in the primary metals and textile and apparel industries. Employment in manufacturing was relatively stable in the 1990s.
Manufacturing employment plunged in the 2000s. Between the business cycle peaks of 2000 and 2007, the sector's employment dropped by 3.4 million, or 20 percent. Although employment in manufacturing, a cyclically sensitive sector, oft en drops sharply during recessions, the early 2000s marked the fi rst time that employment in the sector did not entirely or largely recover during the expansion. Manufacturing employment was hardhit again during the Great Recession of 2008-2009, rebounding only slightly during the ensuing recovery. In total, since 2000, manufacturing employment has fallen by nearly 5 million, or over 28 percent. Unlike the declines experienced in the 1980s, the job losses have been broad-based, aff ecting all industries.
Widespread plant closures accompanied the employment declines. From 2000 to 2014,
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Rapid productivity growth in the computer industry-and, by extension, the strong productivity growth in manufacturing-largely refl ects improvements in high-tech products, not automation. This article is based on "Understanding the Decline in Manufacturing Employment" (Houseman 2018) .
the number of manufacturing establishments dropped by more than 78,000, a 22 percent decline.
Th e Puzzle
Refl ecting stable or declining employment in the manufacturing sector, the share of private sector employment in manufacturing has dropped steadily, and relative declines have been particularly prominent since the 1980s. Manufacturing employment as a share of private sector employment peaked at 35 percent in 1953; by 2016, that share had fallen to just under 10 percent. Manufacturing's share of private sector GDP has experienced a parallel decline: manufacturing's contribution to private sector GDP peaked at 33 percent in 1953, and by 2016 its share was just 13 percent. 1 Th e trends in these shares, depicted in the right scale of Figure 1 , suggest that performance in the manufacturing sector has been weak relative to the rest of the economy. Figure 1 also shows indices for the private sector and manufacturing real (infl ation-adjusted) GDP on the left scale. Paradoxically, in view of manufacturing's declining employment and GDP shares, real GDP growth in manufacturing has largely kept pace with that of the private sector overall. Only since the Great Recession has real output growth been noticeably slower in manufacturing than in the aggregate economy.
Reconciling Manufacturing's Declining Shares with Robust Output Growth
How can these apparently contradictory trends be reconciled? If real GDP growth for manufacturing has kept pace with real GDP growth in the aggregate economy yet manufacturing's share of private sector GDP is falling, it must be the case that prices of manufactured goods have grown more slowly than the average growth in prices of goods and services in the economy.
Similarly, manufacturing's declining share of private sector employment results because manufacturing employment is growing more slowly than the average for the private sector.
Th e relationships between labor, GDP, and productivity growth may be expressed as a simple accounting identity, which shows that the diff erence in the growth rates of labor employed in the aggregate private sector and in manufacturing is equal to the diff erence in their real GDP growth rates less the diff erence in their labor productivity growth rates. 2 If manufacturing's real GDP growth rate is approximately the same as the average for the private sector, as indicated in Figure  1 , then all, or virtually all, of manufacturing's declining employment share is accounted for by higher labor productivity growth. Many economists have taken the patterns shown in Figure 1 , and related descriptive evidence, to infer that the higher productivity growth in manufacturing-implicitly or explicitly assumed to refl ect automationhas largely caused the relative and absolute declines of manufacturing employment. Even when some role for trade is recognized, it is deemed small, and the decline is taken as inevitable. 3 Broadly, there are two problems with this conclusion. First, the descriptive evidence is misleading and has been widely misinterpreted. Th e low growth in prices, strong real output growth, and high productivity growth in manufacturing are largely driven by one industry-computer and electronic products (hereaft er computer industry)-and refl ect the statistical adjustment of price defl ators of computers and semiconductors for improvements in product quality.
Second, as researchers widely recognize, accounting identities and other descriptive evidence per se cannot be used to draw inferences about the causes of the relative and absolute decline in manufacturing employment. Productivity growth does not by itself cause employment reductions and may refl ect many forces, including import competition and off shoring.
I discuss each problem in turn. 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 
Th e Outsized Eff ect of the Computer Industry on Manufacturing Statistics
Many of the products produced in the computer industry have undergone substantial and rapid technical advances. Th e semiconductors embedded in our electronics, for example, are much more powerful today than they were a decade or even a year ago. Likewise, the computers and related devices that consumers and businesses buy today have much greater functionality than in the past. Th e statistical agencies account for the rapid improvements in product quality in the industry through adjustments to price defl ators; for some products, adjusted prices have declined rapidly over time.
Adjusting product price defl ators in the computer industry for improvements in product quality, in turn, has large eff ects on the industry's measured real GDP and productivity growth. Although the computer industry has always accounted for less than 15 percent of value-added in manufacturing, because of its extraordinary measured real GDP and productivity growth, it has an outsized eff ect on measured real output and productivity growth in the sector, skewing these statistics and giving a misleading impression of the health of American manufacturing. Figure 2 displays indices of real GDP in the private sector and manufacturing, as published and omitting the computer industry. Th e computer industry has had large eff ects on measured real GDP growth in manufacturing since the 1980s. From 1979 to 2000, measured real GDP growth in manufacturing was 97 percent of the average for the private sector; when the computer industry is dropped from both series, manufacturing's real GDP growth rate is just 45 percent that of the private sector average. Between 2000 and 2016, real GDP growth in manufacturing was 63 percent of the average private sector growth. Omitting the computer industry from each series, manufacturing's measured real output growth is only about 0.2 percent per year and just 12 percent of the average for the private sector in the 2000s. Without the computer industry, measured real output in manufacturing was lower in 2016 than in 2007 at the start of the Great Recession. In addition, without the computer industry, labor productivity growth was no higher or only somewhat higher in manufacturing than in the private sector overall (Houseman 2018) .
Once the anomalous eff ects of the computer industry are excluded, descriptive data no longer provide prima facie evidence that higher rates of automation were primarily responsible for the long-term decline in manufacturing's share of employment. Rather, they suggest that understanding the reasons for the slow output growth in manufacturing output is critical.
It is also important to recognize that the rapid productivity growth accompanying output growth in the computer industry has little to do with automation-production of computers and semiconductors has been automated for many years.
Rather, rapid productivity growth in the industry-and, by extension, the strong productivity growth in manufacturing-largely refl ects improvements in high-tech products. Nor is the rapid growth in measured computer and semiconductor output a good indicator of the international competitiveness of domestic manufacturing of these products. As detailed in Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon (2015) , the locus of production of these products has been shift ing to Asia, even as the industry was driving the apparent robust growth in the manufacturing sector.
Interpreting productivity growth
Labor productivity is measured as real GDP (the returns to capital and labor) divided by labor input (hours worked or employment). Labor productivity will increase if processes are automated-that is, if businesses invest in capital equipment and that equipment substitutes for workers in the production process. Measured growth in labor productivity, however, captures many factors besides automation. As just discussed, 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 Private industry Manufacturing Private industry, less computers Manufacturing, less computers the strong productivity growth in the manufacturing sector has been driven by productivity growth in the computer industry, which largely stems from product improvements owing to research and development.
In addition, manufacturers have outsourced many activities previously done in-house, either to domestic or foreign suppliers, or have shift ed their input sources to lower-cost, oft en foreign, providers. If the outsourced activities are primarily done by relatively low-paid workers, or if the outsourced labor is cheaper than the in-house labor, measured labor productivity will increase. Shift ing to lower-cost input sources will raise measured productivity as well (Houseman et al. 2011) .
International competition also may directly impact measured manufacturing productivity by aff ecting the composition of products produced and processes used in the United States. Th e industries and plants within industries most aff ected by increased competition from low-wage countries will likely be the most labor-intensive, raising measured labor productivity. For example, case study research on the impact of the wave of Asian furniture imports in the early 2000s shows that plant closures and employment declines were concentrated in the most labor-intensive furniture industries, and within industries less aff ected by imports, the most labor-intensive processes were off shored. 4 Productivity growth surged in some manufacturing industries during the early 2000s, a period marked by a precipitous decline in manufacturing employment and factory closures. A superfi cial reading of the data might lead one to conclude that productivity in the form of automation caused the relative and absolute declines in manufacturing employment. Yet given the massive structural change occurring at the time, accelerated productivity growth may largely refl ect changes in the composition of products Susan N. Houseman is vice president and director of research at the Upjohn Institute. 
Discussion
Th e aggregate manufacturing output and productivity statistics, dominated by the computer industry, mask considerable weakness in most manufacturing industries, where real output growth has been much slower than in the private sector overall since the 1980s and has been anemic or declining since 2000. Because manufacturing has deep supply chains and accounts for a disproportionate share of R&D in the economy, the health of manufacturing industries has important implications for employment and output growth and innovation in the economy. Understanding the causes of the decline is necessary for developing sensible policy responses.
Th e prevailing view that automation largely caused the swift relative and absolute declines in U.S. manufacturing employment in the 2000s refl ects a misinterpretation of the numbers. Moreover, the automation view is not backed by rigorous research. Studies have failed to fi nd that automation was a signifi cant cause of the precipitous decline in manufacturing employment in the 2000s. And while industrial robots may have the potential to displace many workers in the future, any eff ects on manufacturing employment to date are small.
A large and growing body of research has also examined the eff ects of trade on domestic manufacturing in the 2000s. No study captures all aspects of globalization and its eff ects on manufacturing and aggregate employment, and the limitations of any individual study need to be recognized. Collectively, however, the research points to sizable adverse eff ects from trade on employment, output, and investment. 5 Th e denial by many in both the Republican and Democrat parties of globalization's signifi cant role in manufacturing's recent employment declines has inhibited much-needed, informed debate over trade policies.
NOTES
1. GDP, also called value added, refl ects the contributions an industry or sector makes to output from its labor and capital.
Formally,
, where the T and M subscripts indicate the total private and manufacturing sectors, and , , and represent the growth rates in labor, GDP, and labor productivity, respectively.
